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Is Monopoly Rent Seeking Compatible with 
Wealth Maximization? 
Mark Glick* 
This article questions whether the wealth-mimizing 
effcciency criterion adopted by the law-and-economics movement 
is compatible with the implicit theory of social costs contained 
in theories of rent-seeking behavior. My argument is simple: 
under the wealth-maximizing efficiency criterion, all voluntary 
market transactions yield welfare gains. Since many types of 
rent-seeking activities involve purely voluntary market 
transactions, such market activities must also necessarily lead 
to  wealth gains and not to social costs, as the rent-seeking 
literature asserts.' The theory of rent-seeking activities 
transforms welfare gains into costs only by introducing 
arbitrary value judgments into the economic and legal analysis. 
If my claim is true, it has important implications for the debate 
concerning the social costs of monopoly. As the participants in 
that debate recognize, if market based rent-seeking activities 
do not constitute social costs, then the estimated social costs 
from monopoly are small, possibly calling into question the 
need for expensive antitrust enf~rcement.~ Moreover, as 
explained below, without rent-seeking costs from monopoly, 
there is little defense to claims of the indeterminacy of 
* Associate Professor of Economics, Adjunct Professor of Law, University of 
Utah; J.D. 1990, Columbia; Ph.D. 1985, New School for Social Research; M.A. 1980, 
B.A. 1976, U.C.L.A. The author acknowledges helpful discussions and suggestions 
from Robert Lande, Lance Girton, John Flynn, E.K. Hunt and Donald Campbell. 
1. See, e.g. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of 
Monopoly, 78 IOWA L. REV. 371 (1993); Herbert Hovenkamp,,Antitrust's Protected 
Classes, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1989); Richard S. Markovits, Second-Best 
Theory and the Standard Analysis of Monopoly Rent Seeking: A Generalizable 
Critique, a "Sociological" Account, and Some Illustrative Stories, 78 IOWA L. REV. 
327 (1993); William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 
88 MICH. L. REV. 2151 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly 
and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807 (1975). 
2. See supra note 1. 
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antitrust enforcement outcomes based on the economic theory 
of "second bestaH3 
I. RENT SEEKING AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY 
The usual method of measuring the social costs of 
monopoly is illustrated by the partial equilibrium economic 
model of monopoly with constant marginal and average costs.* 
DIAGRAM 1 
In Diagram 1 above, the triangle WL1 measures the 
deadweight loss to monopoly. The deadweight loss represents 
consumers who would have purchased the product a t  issue at 
the competitive price, PC, but then substituted to other 
products once prices rose to Pm as a result of the imposition of 
monopoly. The quantity of the monopolist's lost sales because of 
the higher price is equal to Qc-Qm, and the resulting lost 
consumer surplus as a result of the consumer substitutions is 
WLL5 
The rectangle WL2 should not be thought of as a 
deadweight loss, but rather as a measure of income transfer 
from those individuals who do not substitute away when the 
3. See infia note 21 and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS 
190-91 (14th ed. 1992); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 450
(1993). 
5. The consumer surplus for a unit of output is the difference between the 
consumer's reservation price, or amount she is willing to pay, and the price she is 
required to pay. I discuss consumer surplus in more detail below. Note here that 
WL1 is an overstatement of the consumer surplus lost to the society, because it 
does not take account of the additional consumer surplus gained by the consumer 
in the substitute market. 
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price increases from PC to Pm. Since these consumers continue 
to purchase the product a t  the higher price, all that occurs is a 
transfer of income from the consumers to the monopolist in the 
amount of WL2. Moreover, from a social point of view, society 
as a whole is neither richer nor poorer as a result of this 
transfer. All that has transpired is a redistribution of income 
between individuals. Rent-seeking theory seeks to transform 
this income transfer into a cost. 
Rent seeking is usually defined as the political activity of 
persons or groups seeking monopoly rights or privileges 
granted by the g~vernment .~ Such privileges include subsidies, 
tax breaks, price supports, tariffs, import quotas and other 
entitlemenk7 Usually, these activities are said to pose two 
types of social costs. First, the privileges themselves represent 
a deadweight loss to consumers. Second, the expenditure of 
resources on their pursuit arguably represents a rent-seeking 
social cost because of the more productive alternative uses for 
such  resource^.^ In antitrust literature, many have contended 
that the rectangle WL2 reflects just such a social rent-seeking 
cost.g Originally formulated by Gordon Tullock, the rent- 
seeking theory applied here posits that firms will expend real 
resources in the search for monopoly profits-for example, by 
hiring lawyers and lobbyists.1° If firms are profit maximizing, 
the amount of resources expected to be used in the rent-seeking 
process will be equal to the expected profits from monopoly, or 
the rectangle WL2. For example, suppose that five firms are 
competing for monopoly profits in the amount of $500 (i.e., 
WL2 = $500). If each competitor believes that it has an equal 
probability of obtaining the monopoly, each firm will be willing 
to invest up to $100 in the process of obtaining market 
power." Thus, as a direct result of the monopoly, society will 
6. See Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking: A Survey, 35 KYKLOS 575, 587 
(1982). 
7. William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, Economic Models of Interest 
Groups: An Introductory Survey, 35 A.M. J. POL. SCI. 512, 525 (1991). 
8. Tollison, supra note 6, a t  576. 
9. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 
W. ECON. J. 224 (1967); Tollison, supra note 6, at 581. 
10. See also Tollison, supra note 6, at 576 ("[Ilf the process by which 
monopoly rents are contrived is subject to competition (e.g., lobbying), the 
analytical fiction of these rents as a pure transfer vanishes because resources spent 
in  the pursuit of a transfer are wasted from society's point of view.") (emphasis 
omitted). 
11. See infra note 54 (discussing the fact that the expenditures can exceed 
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waste resources in the amount of WL2, making the total social 
costs due to monopoly equal to WL1 + WL2.12 As discussed 
below, the crucial difference here is that no government action 
is sought. The rent-seeking activities occur entirely within the 
private sector on the basis of purely market activities. 
This rent-seeking argument is important because it solves 
two critical problems faced by advocates of vigorous antitrust 
enforcement. The first problem is that when WL2 is not treated 
as a cost, the total social costs due to monopoly are very small. 
For many years economists have been aware that, with certain 
simplifying assumptions, the consumer welfare loss from 
monopoly, WLI, is empirically mea~urable.'~ From Diagram 1 
i t  is evident that (assuming a linear demand curve) the 
deadweight loss WL1 is equal to one-half the product (Pm- 
Pc)(Qc-Qm). This quantity can be shown to be a function of the 
elasticity of demand and the square of the percentage price 
increase resulting from monopoly. Arnold Harberger was the 
first to seize upon the measurement possibilities.14 He used 
profit rate differentials to proxy the price distortion and 
assumed that elasticity was unitary for the years 1924-1928. 
He found that the social welfare loss from monopoly is less 
than one-tenth of one percent of Gross National Product (GNP), 
or about (in 1954) $2 per person in the United Stated5 
Harberger's article fostered a flurry of criticism and 
recalculation.16 Most confirmed Harberger's small estimate of 
the deadweight loss.17 Others came up with larger estimates, 
the expected profits). 
12. See Anne 0. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 
64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 295-301 (1974); Tullock, supra note 9. 
13. See, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. 
ECON. REV. 77 (1954). 
14. Tollison, supra note 6, at 579. 
15. See Harberger, supra note 13, at 84. 
16. See, e.g., CHARLES K. ROWLEY, ANTITRUST AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 48 
(1973); DEAN A. WORCESTER, JR., MONOPOLY, BIG BUSINESS, AND WELFARE IN THE 
POSTWAR UNITED STATES 2 10-27 (1967); Abrarn Bergson, On Monopoly Welfare 
Losses, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 853 (1973); J.A. Kay, A General Equilibrium Approach 
to the Measurement of Monopoly Welfare Loss, 1 INT'L J .  INDUS. ORG. 317 (1983); 
George J. Stigler, The Statistics of Monopoly and Merger, 64 J. POL. ECON. 33 
(1956); Bjorn Wahlroos, Monopoly Welfare Losses Under Uncertainty, 51  S. ECON. J. 
429 (1984); G.K. Yarrow, Welfare Losses in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition, 
33 J. INDUS. ECON. 515 (1985). 
17. See, e.g., David Schwartzman, The Burden of Monopoly, 68 J. POL. ECON. 
627 (1960); John J. Siegfried & Thomas K. Tiemann, The Welfare Cost of 
Monopoly: An Inter-Industry Analysis, 12 ECON. INQUIRY 190, 190 (1974); Dean A. 
Worcester, Jr., New Estimates of the Welfare Loss to Monopoly, U.S.: 1956-1969, 40 
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some as high as 7% of GNP.18 My own work indicates that 
because short-run profit rate differentials primarily capture 
disequilibrium effects rather than monopoly, most measures 
overestimate the deadweight loss attributed to mon~poly. '~ 
The consensus among economists is well-summarized by 
Sherer: 
I t  i s  hard to think of realistic circumstances under which the 
dead-weight loss triangle [WLl] would be very large, for i t  
involves the square of the relative price distortion ratio [(Pm- 
Pc)/Pc], whose average value was only 0.036 in the Harberger 
sample and 0.084 in seven industries with high barriers to 
entry analyzed by David Qual l~ .~ '  
Because WL1 is typically judged to be relatively small, 
maybe the costs of antitrust enforcement outweigh their 
benefits. This is especially problematic since the low Harberger 
figures were obtained for the middle 1920s-a period of less 
than rigorous antitrust enforcement.'' The rent-seeking 
conversion of the quantity WL2 into an additional cost of 
monopoly thus critically helps justify massive government 
expenditures on antitrust enforcement. 
A second reason why the rent-seeking argument is 
important is that it  provides a sensible reply to claims that 
antitrust enforcement actually has a detrimental impact on 
consumer welfare as a result of second-best problems. As 
Posner observes, "[Olnce [WL2] is recognized as being relevant 
to the costs of monopoly, an objection to the economic analysis 
of monopoly based on the theory of the 'second best' 
 disappear^."'^ Second-best problems arise when a substitute 
for a monopolized product is not sold a t  the competitive price. 
S. ECON. J. 234 (1973). 
18. Keith Cowling & Dennis C. Mueller, The Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 
88 ECON. J. 727, 745 (1978); see also Fr6d6ric Jenny & Andr6-Paul Weber, 
Aggregate Welfare Loss Due to Monopoly Power in the French Economy, 32 J. 
INDUS. ECON. 113, 128 (1983); Dennis 0. Olson & Donald L. Bumpass, An 
Intertemporal Analysis of the Welfare Cost of Monopoly Power, 1 REV. INDUS. ORG. 
308, 313-14 (1984). 
19. Mark A. Glick & Hans Ehrbar, Long-Run Equilibrium in the Empirical 
Study of Monopoly and Competition, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 151 (1990). 
20. F.M. SHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 667 (3d ed. 1990) (footnote omitted). 
21. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 25 
(1976). 
22. Id. a t  13. 
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Suppose, for example, that the Department of Justice is 
considering a merger in the butter industry that would raise 
butter prices by 5%. However, two years previous a cartel had 
formed in the margarine industry causing margarine prices to 
rise 5%. As a result of the rise in margarine prices, some 
consumers switched to butter (resulting in deadweight loss). 
Because of the pre-existing price distortion in a close 
substitute, the merger between butter firms, even though i t  
will raise butter prices, will also reduce the deadweight loss by 
causing butter and margarine prices to conform more closely to 
the original competitive price proportions. When account is 
taken of second-best issues, the butter monopoly could result in 
increased inefficiency. However, if the change in  income 
distribution is considered a cost because of expected rent- 
seeking behavior, enforcement action in butter can be justified 
as reducing the rent-seeking cost, independent of any second- 
best problems. Thus, the rent-seeking conversion of distribution 
into a social cost eliminates a major source of uncertainty 
concerning the impact of antitrust enforcement. I t  is therefore 
important to consider whether the rent-seeking arguments 
have sound  foundation^.^^ 
When economists discuss efficiency, they generally mean 
Pareto optimality. A transaction is Pareto-improving if it can 
enhance the welfare of a t  least one individual without making 
anyone else worse off. Pareto-optimal distributions are states of 
affairs in which no further Pareto improvements can be made. 
It follows that for a transaction to be Pareto-improving there 
must be unanimous consent by all affected. Put differently, the 
requirement that no one is harmed provides every potentially 
affected individual with veto power over every transaction. I t  is 
generally recognized that this property of the Pareto criterion 
imposes severe limitations on its applicability." As a result, 
23. The characterization of WL2 as income distribution or as a cost does not 
impact the optimal sanction for antitrust violations. The optimal antitrust fine will 
equal the total net harm to others. In the monopoly context, this will be equal to 
WL1 + WL2. WL2 is a net harm to consumers whether it is characterized as a 
distribution loss to consumers or a social cost resulting from rent seeking. See 
Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 115, 125-26 (1993); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust 
Violations, 50 U .  CHI. L. REV. 652, 653-61 (1983). 
24. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency 
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the law-and-economics approach has adopted an alternative 
criterion, called wealth maximization, or the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation principle.25 Although economists rarely openly 
admit using any criterion other than Pareto optimality to 
explain efficiency, the contrary is evident from a reading of any 
economics textbook o r  observing the actual application of the 
efficiency concept. According to Posner, 
Because the conditions for Pareto superiority are almost 
never satisfied in the real world, yet economists talk quite a 
bit about efficiency, i t  is pretty clear that the operating 
definition of efficiency in economics is not Pareto superiority. 
When an economist says that free trade or competition or the 
control of pollution or some other policy or state of the world 
is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient.26 
As opposed to the Pareto criterion, a transaction is 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or wealth maximizing, if the individuals 
that benefit from a transaction experience a benefit that 
exceeds anyone else's loss, such that they can still retain a net 
gain after potentially compensating any individuals that 
experience diminished welfare.27 Obviously, ac tua l  
compensation is not required, or else the wealth maximization 
principle would be transformed back into the Pareto criterion. 
The intuition behind wealth maximization is that efficiency 
can be conceived of as the maximizing of the social "pie," while 
distribution of the parts of the pie can be considered as a 
separate issue.28 The pie is not the total set of goods and 
services in the economy. Rather, the substance of the pie is  
"utilityy7 backed by purchasing power; or, put differently, the 
pie consists of utility revealed by willingness to pay. The subtle 
lapse into considering wealth as  physical goods and services 
seems to be almost irresistible in the law-and-economics 
literature, yet it is clearly not consistent with economic theory. 
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 489 (1980) ("Pareto- 
superiority criterion is useless for most policy questions"). 
25. See J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 
(1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
26. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (4th ed. 1992). 
27. Posner, supra note 24, at 491. 
28. For a criticism of the consistency of this view of efficiency, see Victor P. 
Goldberg, On Positive Theories of Redistribution, 11 J. ECON. ISSUES 119 (1977). 
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A simple example can illustrate the distinction. Suppose good 
W is bartered from Individual A to Individual B. Assuming B 
values the item higher than A, putting W in the hands of B 
increases social wealth, even though our measure of GNP 
remains constant. Posner is therefore correct when he proposes 
the following example: 
Before the transaction you had a bag of oranges worth less 
than $5 to you and I had $5; after the transaction you have 
$5 and I have a bag of oranges worth more than $5 to me. We 
are both richer, as measured by the money value we attach to 
the goods in question.29 
An absolutely critical corollary of the wealth-maximizing 
efficiency criterion is that voluntary trade between individuals 
results in welfare gains to both parties to the t r a n s a c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
This proposition forms the basis of the most fundamental 
prescriptions of law and  economic^.^^ As a result of gains to 
trade, it is universally argued that entitlements should be 
protected by property rights when transaction costs are low.32 
Property rights force others who wish to obtain an entitlement 
to buy i t  from its holder in a voluntary transaction in the 
market. Such private property rules are only efficient because 
(according to the wealth maximization criterion) voluntary 
transactions are expected to yield wealth gains to both 
individuals. If one of the individuals to the transaction were a 
potential loser he or she would simply refuse to undertake the 
transaction. If this were not true the case for private property 
rights would not follow.33 In contrast, liability rules, such as 
negligence, are only necessary when transaction costs make 
29. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103, 120 (1979). 
30. One difficult issue is defining the boundary between voluntary 
transactions and duress. See MAKK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
ch. 3 (1987); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. 
L. REV. 603 (1943). 
31. See, eg., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND TR ATE RIALS ON 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 180 (1992) ("If two parties contract voluntarily and with full 
information, both must expect the contracted-for exchange to improve their 
welfare. . . . Only when voluntary cooperation breaks down does the law inter- 
vene."). 
32. POSNER, supra note 26, at 15. 
33. The reason is that property rights force individuals to transact voluntarily 
in the marketplace. The case fm private property dissolves if it cannot be assumed 
that voluntary market transactions are efficiency-improving. 
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voluntary market transactions i n fea~ ib l e .~~  This explains, for 
example, why negligence rules are necessary in the tort area. A 
tort involves strangers in a situation unlikely to be amenable 
to negotiation and private contract.35 The economic 
explanation of liability rules also assumes that if individuals 
could successfully privately negotiate, then social gains would 
result. 
I t  is universally argued that monopoly is inefficient. Many 
argue further that the goals of the antitrust laws should solely 
be to increase effi~iency.~~ But in what sense is monopoly 
inefficient and competition efficient? Only two possible answers 
exist: Either competition is Pareto-improving, or it is wealth- 
maximizing. The first possibility cannot explain why monopoly 
is inefficient. It is obvious that a movement from monopoly to 
competition is not Pareto-improving. Under the Pareto 
criterion, an efficient change is one in which some gain but 
none lose, yet a transition from monopoly to competition harms 
the monopolist in the form of lost profits, or W L ~ . ~ ~  Therefore, 
eliminating monopoly cannot be Pareto-improving. In fact, it is 
possible to have Pareto-optimal distributions with or without 
monopoly.38 
Accordingly, the only possible ground on which i t  can be 
claimed that competition is more efficient than monopoly is 
wealth maximization. The argument is evident. When 
competition is restored in Diagram 1, consumers gain WL2 and 
WL1, but the potential compensation necessary to make the 
monopolist whole is only WL2. Thus, after potential 
compensation, consumers would retain WL1, and the move 
34. POSNER, supra note 26, at 164. 
35. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 
1089, 1106-10 (1972) (discussing the need for liability rules). 
36. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF 51 (1978) (discussing the goal of antitrust to "maximize consumer 
welfare"). 
37. See Warren J. Samuels, Welfare Economics, Power and Property, in LAW 
AND ECONOMICS: AN INSTITUTION PER SPEC TI^ 9, 23 (Warren J. Samuels & A. 
Allan Schmid eds., 1981); see also Victor P .  Goldberg, Public Choice-Property 
Rights, 8 J .  ECON. ISSUES 555, 556 (1974). 
38. Samuels, supra note 37. 
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from monopoly to competition is wealth-maximizing, or Kaldor- 
Hicks efficient. 
It might be objected that, if wealth maximization is the 
basis of the claims of monopoly inefficiency, then private 
transactions between the parties themselves should lead to the 
efficient level of output. This is predicted by the famous Coase 
T h e ~ r e m . ~ ~  In the monopoly case, this would require that 
consumers bribe the monopolist with some amount of money 
(between WL2 and WL2 + WL1) to expand output from Qm to 
Qc. Such a transaction is inconceivable because of the 
enormous transaction costs involved in consumers collectively 
undertaking to make such an offer. It follows that when 
transaction costs present a barrier to private transactions, 
liability rules (like the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act) 
should be employed to mimic market outcomes. Viewed in this 
way, antitrust policy is consistent with the law-and-economics 
approach to other areas of the common law. 
It is instructive to compare the above discussion of the 
inefficiency resulting from monopoly with the standard 
economic analysis of consumer surplus (assuming cardinal 
utility). In the simple, single-good context, social efficiency is 
maximized when the following condition holds: 
MC = MU, 
where MC is the marginal cost of producing output and MU is 
the marginal utility that consumers derive from the output.40 
Like the wealth-maximizing criterion, the above efficiency 
condition maximizes total utility measured in willingness to 
pay. Notice that, in the monopoly case, this efficiency condition 
is not satisfied. Because the monopolist produces output to a 
point where price is above marginal cost (while consumers 
continue to purchase products to the point where prices equal 
marginal utility), under monopoly MC < MU. This implies that 
wealth can be increased if the monopolist were to expand 
output. 
Economists can also directly measure the deadweight loss 
triangle by estimating the compensating and equivalent 
39. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), 
reprinted in RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95 (1988). 
40. See WILLIAM J .  BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, MICROECONOMICS: 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 257-58 (6th ed. 1994); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser, A 
Guide to the Perplexed Claims of Efficiency in the Law, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 591, 
592-93 (1980). 
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variations. Suppose that a consumer is consuming a 
consumption bundle consisting of butter and margarine. The 
price of butter increases and the consumer reduces her butter 
consumption and increases her margarine consumption. How 
much did the change hurt the consumer? In other words, how 
much money would the consumer have to be paid after the 
price change to be just as well off a s  before the price change? 
This is called the compensating variation in  income. An 
alternative way to measure the same harm is to ask how much 
money would have to be taken away from the consumer before 
the price change in order to make her as well off as she would 
be after the price change. This alternative method is called the 
equivalent variation in income. In most situations the two 
measures will not be the same.*' However, both of these 
techniques can be used to empirically measure the utility loss 
resulting from a price increase if we assume utility is measured 
by willingness to pay and we can construct utility functions 
that capture individual preferences. The consumer surplus 
measure of utility loss is directly related to compensating 
variation and equivalent ~ariation.~'  As Professor Willig 
 demonstrate^:^ the change in consumer surplus due to a price 
increase generally lies between the compensating variation and 
the equivalent variation.44 Two observations can be made in  
connection with the comparison of the law-and-economics 
approach to monopoly and the standard economic analysis. 
First, both approaches are completely consistent regarding 
WL1, and second, it is obvious that in both models the 
deadweight loss resulting from monopoly is a loss of utility, not 
a loss of physical goods and services. 
IV. INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN WEALTH MAXIMIZATION AND 
RENT SEEKING 
While the deadweight loss from monopoly, WL1, is 
consistent with the wealth-maximizing efficiency criterion, the 
41. The two measures are only the same when utility hnctions are quasi- 
linear. 
42. The economist's approach to consumer surplus thus underscores the fact 
that wealth maximizing means expanding the pie of utility measured by 
willingness to pay, not by a set of physical goods and services. 
43. See Robert D. Willig, Consumr's Surplus Without Apology, 66 AM. ECON. 
REV. 589 (1976). 
44. See the appendix for an illustration of compensating and equivalent 
variations. 
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rent-seeking argument that treats WL2 as a cost is not 
consistent. To see why, consider the types of expenditures 
typically conceived of as rent seeking. Lawyers and lobbyists 
usually receive the brunt of the criticism. Therefore, suppose 
that a firm interested in obtaining a monopoly hires a lawyer 
to undertake sham litigation (unbeknownst to the lawyer), and 
that the sum of the legal fees charged is equal to WL2. Can 
such a transaction be called a social cost? I do not believe it 
can. The problem is that this transaction between the potential 
monopolist and the lawyer is being undertaken voluntarily in 
the market. I t  is exactly the kind of transaction that property 
rules are designed to encourage. Under the wealth-maximizing 
criterion, we must expect social gains, not social costs, from the 
transaction. 
What the wealth-maximization criterion specifically does 
not allow us to do is look behind preferences or treat some 
preferences differently than others, but this is precisely what 
rent-seeking theories ask us to do.45 We cannot turn the 
voluntary transaction between the monopolist and the lawyer 
into a cost by simply stating that the purpose of the desire or 
the preference on the part of the buyer of legal services was to 
achieve a monopoly, even if the monopoly itself is wealth- 
reducing. Once we begin to inquire into the purposes of 
preferences, the foundations of law and economics that derive 
from wealth maximization are seriously compromised. I t  will 
no longer be sound policy to simply defend property rights that 
channel disputes into the marketplace, because no longer will 
all voluntary transactions be unambiguously wealth- 
maximizing. Instead, society will have to monitor voluntary 
transactions to filter out those that are for rent-seeking 
purposes. Symmetrically, it might also be prudent to ask 
whether non-wealth-maximizing activities that we condemn 
under the wealth-maximizing criterion might not, in fact, have 
some ultimate wealth-increasing goal.46 Thus, rent-seeking 
45. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 23 (1988) 
("Economists leave to other disciplines, such as psychology and sociology, the study 
of whence these preferences came. We take them as given.") (emphasis added); see 
also Goldberg, supra note 37, at  556-57 (discussing public choice-property rights 
literature that considers "individual preferences [as] the ultimate data" and "tastes 
as given exogenously"). 
46. I t  is possible that the concept of rent seeking is best explained by a 
reliance on a concept of production efficiency. Production efficiency requires that a 
given level of output be produced with the least cost combination of inputs for a 
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theories force us onto a slippery slope by asking us t o  value 
different preferences differently. 
An alternative way to approach the problem is illustrated 
in the following example. Suppose that we observe a consumer 
going into a department store to purchase a pair of shoes. 
However, once in the store, the consumer observes that a storm 
is brewing outside. As a result, the consumer decides to buy 
boots rather than shoes. In this example, we would say that 
the consumer's preferences have changed, but that there is no 
deadweight loss. Suppose instead that the same consumer upon 
entering the store notices that shoes have gone up in price 
because of a monopoly in the shoe industry, and so she decides 
to purchase boots. As opposed to the first scenario, now we 
would maintain that a deadweight loss has occurred. My 
argument is that rent seeking is more like the first example 
than the second. When people purchase locks because they 
notice their neighbor's house has been burglarized, or when 
they buy lawyer services because of the lure of monopoly 
profits, their actions merely express a change of preferences, 
not a social cost. 
There are also several other reasons why modifying the 
original wealth-maximizing criterion can cause difficulties. A 
first issue is boundary indeterminacy. Rent seeking asks us t o  
modify the wealth-maximizing criterion to  assert that an 
activity is inefficient if it is wealth-reducing or  if it is a means 
t o  achieving some other wealth-reducing activity. But why stop 
there? Suppose that the lawyer in our example goes to the 
store t o  purchase pencils.47 This is again a voluntary 
transaction which should be expected to bring social gains and 
which is wealth-increasing. But what if the pencils were being 
given technology. In the example above, the monopolist is producing widgets but 
requires the lawyer's services to maintain the monopoly. The lawyer's services are 
then analyzed as an unnecessary cost of production of widgets. But this approach 
arbitrarily defines the output solely as a widget. Actually, in this example there is 
joint production of widgets and lawyer's services. Labelling something as 
productively efficient does not escape the problem that when the owner enters into 
a voluntary exchange we assume it is utility- or wealth-maximizing even if not 
profit-maximizing. The two concepts will be the same only if we correctly identify 
the joint products being produced. I t  is not obvious to me that production efficiency 
can solve the problem. To explain that some voluntary transactions are allocatively 
efficient but not productively efficient would require that we unambiguously label 
some purchases purely as means to other ends and others just as ends. 
47. For an example of how rent-seeking arguments have entered into the 
popular culture, see Stuart Speiser & John Maher, What Are Lawyers Worth?, 
A.B.A. J. ,  March 1994, at 122. 
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purchased to help the lawyer write the brief, the purpose of 
which, in turn, is to aid the potential monopolist? Is the pencil 
transaction also a social cost? The potential list of transactions 
that could be forced under the social cost umbrella becomes 
endless. At bottom, the rent-seeking exercise resolves into a 
hypothetical comparison between our existing society and some 
ideal.48 The ideal society is one in which all wealth- 
maximizing transactions have taken place. This is equivalent to 
defining a market economy without transaction costs and 
strategic behavior if we accept the principles of the Coase 
The~rern.~'  Rent-seeking social costs are the deviations of the 
actual from the ideal society. Although this is the thought 
experiment that rent-seeking theories ultimately force us to 
perform, it is unclear whether i t  is even feasible. 
First, specifying a single ideal society may be impossible. 
Welfare economics has yet to discover a criterion that can 
distinguish between the multitude of possible Pareto-optimal 
distributions, and it is well known that the wealth-maximizing 
criterion cannot be used to extract a single ideal 
d i~ t r ibu t ion .~~  At least one wealth-maximizing society will 
correspond to each possible initial distribution of resources. 
Suppose, for example, in one such initial distribution an  
individual, X, craves power and is lucky enough to be endowed 
with significant purchasing power. The society that results 
after all voluntary transactions take place might include 
monopoly. Monopoly could conceivably result in such a society 
because X may be unwilling to accept a bribe from consumers 
in the amount of WL2 + WL1 to relinquish her monopoly 
because she also enjoys power and requires an even higher 
payment to forego that enjoyment.51 Thus, monopoly, and as a 
48. In this respect, rent-seeking theories are identical in structure to Paul A. 
Baran's arguments in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH (4th ed. 1967). There, 
Baran argued that third-world development is hampered by excess unproductive 
labor. Unproductive labor, according to Baran, "consists of all labor resulting in the 
output of goods and services the demand for which is attributable to the specific 
conditions and relationships of the capitalist system." Id. at 32 (emphasis omitted). 
49. See Coase, supra note 39. 
50. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 
1963); T. de Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 77, 79 (1941). 
51. The deviation of utility maximization from profit maximization defines an 
agency problem. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the 
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 
305 (1976). 
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corollary the expenditures necessary to obtain monopoly, might 
endure even in the ideal society. 
A second problem involves how to classify activities that do 
not arise in the ideal society but whose effect in the actual 
society is to reduce transaction costs. For example, advertising 
activities that reduce search costs would not be necessary if no 
transaction costs existed, yet their existence in the actual 
society is explained by their effect in reducing transaction 
Although such activities come into being because of 
transaction costs, we would not classify them as rent-seeking. 
A third problem involves how to treat institutions. 
Voluntary exchanges are always made in the presence of given 
state variables. For example, when it is cold I buy a coat, or 
when I am sick I buy medical services. Weather and illness, I 
assume, should be considered state variables in the ideal 
model, but how should institutional arrangements be treated? 
For example, I may purchase legal services because of the tax 
laws. It remains an open question whether there exists a 
criterion for determining which institutional arrangements 
would be part of the ideal society in the absence of transaction 
costs. Yet institutional arrangements will have a dramatic 
impact on what activities do and do not take place in the ideal 
s ~ c i e t y ? ~  
It  is probably clear by now that the rent-seeking thought 
experiment leaves us with an unworkable standard. Even if we 
avoid beginning with an  ideal standard, the actual limits of 
rent-seeking costs cannot be specified. Assume that, "but for" 
some wealth-reducing activity, a new technology would have 
been introduced. Or consider an entire industry that operates 
profitably in the market solely as a result of externalities 
generated by a wealth-reducing activity. For example, assume 
that the sole reason for the gun industry is to provide weapons 
to robbers on the one hand and property owners seeking to 
prevent robbery on the other hand. If the Department of 
Justice received a request to review a merger between the only 
two remaining gun manufacturers which would surely result in 
higher gun prices, should the Department prevent the merger 
52. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 
213 (1961); see also Tollison, supra note 6, at 582 (describing consumer lobbyists 
attempting to limit monopoly as rent seeking). 
53. See John J. Flynn, T h  Chicken and the Egg, in F'UNDAMENTALS OF THE 
ECONOMIC ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 69 (Warren J. Sarnuels ed., 1989). 
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on the grounds that it is wealth-reducing, or should the 
Department allow it because it will reduce social waste? 
A final problem is that rent seeking may be impossible to 
identify empirically. It is virtually impossible to distinguish 
between fierce competition and expenditures meant to achieve 
monopoly. Typically, the kind of expenditures that achieve 
monopoly are also those that either increase information to 
consumers, improve product quality, or cause innovations to 
occur. Some expenditures that are naturally classified as 
competitively desirable may suddenly become rent-seeking 
social costs if they are too effective and competitors file for 
bankruptcy.54 
The rent-seeking literature itself is rife with ambiguity. 
The seminal paper on rent seeking in the monopoly context is 
Gordon Tullock's The Welfare Cost of Tariff, Monopolies and 
ThefLs5 In his paper Tullock provides several examples of 
such ambiguity-each more confusing than the first. His first 
example involves a tariff that will provide rents to selected 
firms. The prospect of rents engenders rent-seeking behavior in 
the form of hiring lobbyists. According to Tullock, these 
expenditures are wasteful because "from the standpoint of 
society as a whole[,] they are spent not in increasing wealth 
but in attempts to transfer o r  resist transfer of wealth."56 
54. The only possible way to salvage rent seeking is to justify it by reference 
to wealth maximization. Consider the monopoly situation again. This time consider 
a hypothetical bargain struck between the consumers and the lawyer. If the 
expenditure by the potential monopolist on the sham litigation brief was exactly 
equal to WL2, then consumers could offer the same lawyer some amount between 
WL2 and (WL2 + WL1) to abstain from producing the pleading. As a result, no 
monopoly would be established and consumers would benefit even after making the 
payment to the lawyer. Thus, total social wealth will have increased. 
The problem is that we cannot be sure that this is always possible. Suppose 
that competitors make sequential investments in order to achieve monopoly, the 
monopoly rent is equal to $500, and there are five competitors. If each has an 
equally likely chance of obtaining the monopoly, the expected value of the 
monopoly rent is $100. Each invests $10 and counters the others' strategic moves. 
There is now a $50 sunk cost. But the competitors still have an incentive to invest 
$100 each, and there will at minimum be $550 in rent-seeking expenditures. Or, in 
the alternative, suppose that the marginal product of a dollar is very small in 
terms of increasing the possibility of winning the monopoly. Thus, for a variety of 
realistic reasons, the consumers would be unable to bribe the recipients of the 
expenditures. For a discussion of both over-dissipation and under-dissipation 
theories, see Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the 
Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON. J. 104 (1984). 
55. Tullock, supra note 9. 
56. Id. at 228. 
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What is unclear is the meaning Tullock gives to the term 
wealth. As described above, in the microeconomic approach and 
in the law-and-economics literature, wealth is a quantity of 
utility measured by willingness to pay, not a set of physical 
goods.57 Consider now Tullock's transaction with the lobbyist. 
Individual A transfers money to lobbyist B in return for B's 
lobbying services. A values the services more than the money, 
while B values the money more than the services. Change 
lobbying services to oranges, and we have Posner's own 
example of wealth maximizing referred to above.58 Moreover, 
transactions that transfer wealth make up a large portion of 
the economy. Many of these transactions may also perform 
important economic functions that have effects on other parts 
of the productive structure. For example, the function of 
financial markets is to transfer wealth, yet such markets play 
critical roles in the economy's functioning. 
In a second example, Tullock discusses the social costs 
resulting from theft. Whereas theft should be more correctly 
viewed as an involuntary transfer, Tullock analyzes theft as a 
pure transfer: "The theft itself is a pure transfer, and has no 
welfare cost, but the existence of theft as a potential activity 
results in very substantial diversion of resources to fields 
where they essentially offset each other, and produce no 
positive product."59 Tullock implies in this example that 
activities that do not result in a product are wasteful. If he 
means to say that services are always wasteful, he is clearly a t  
odds with economic theory. Moreover, the diversion of resources 
because of the theft could easily result in many more physical 
products in the form of locks and guns. 
William Landes seems to make the same error. In 
discussing expenditures aimed at achieving monopoly, he 
writes, "Because these expenditures produce nothing of value, 
they add t o  the social cost of a mon~poly.'"~ Or consider 
Posner, who writes, "The costs incurred in obtaining a 
monopoly have no socially valuable by- product^."^' In both of 
these quotations the authors implicitly abandon wealth- 
maximization principles. Under wealth maximization, value is 
57. See Posner, supra note 29. 
58. See Posner, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
59. Tullock, supra note 9, a t  231. 
60. Landes, supra note 23, at  665. 
61. Posner, supra note 1, a t  809. 
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only revealed by willingness to pay, and gains occur when 
transactions are voluntary. In the expenditures Tullock, Landes 
and Posner describe as aimed at achieving monopoly, this 
criterion is clearly satisfied. When theft or monopoly occurs, 
preferences do indeed change, but we are not entitled to 
prejudge such preferences. 
The rent-seeking arguments are reminiscent of the debate 
concerning productive and unproductive labor that took place 
in the late nineteenth century. At that time, early economists 
struggled t o  develop a consistent criterion by which some labor 
could be classified as productive, while other labor could be 
considered social waste. Unfortunately, no such criterion could 
be found. As Schumpeter observed, attempts to find such a 
criterion served only "to display the word-mindedness of 
economists and their inability to tell a real problem from a 
spurious one."62 
Tullock's examples bring him dangerously close to Adam 
Smith's theory of unproductive labor. Like Tullock's second 
example, Smith argued that only the production of physical 
goods was productive because only physical goods preserve 
value.63 But later economists correctly pointed out that such a 
distinction is unworkable. What is the difference between a 
child-care worker who provides a service by reading a story, 
and a worker who creates a paperback book that is read and 
then thrown away? Additionally, Tullock asks us to distinguish 
between activities that create wealth and those that transfer 
wealth. How should we then characterize transportation 
services such as trucking, rail service and the like? Do such 
services create or transfer wealth? It  was precisely these sorts 
of ambiguities and paradoxes that forced the economics 
profession to abandon the distinction between productive and 
unproductive labor. Concerns about unproductive labor are now 
only of historical intere~t. '~ Rent-seeking theories thus invite 
us to reintroduce ideas long since abandoned. We should resist 
the temptation. 
62. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 631 (Elizabeth 
B. Schumpeter ed., 1954). 
63. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 314 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random 
House 1965) (n.p. 1776). 
64. See, e.g., ROBERT LEKACHMAN, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC IDEAS 83 (1959); 
E.K. Hunt, The Categories of Productive and Unproductive Labor in Marxist 
Economic Theory, 43 SCI. & SOC'Y 303 (1979). 
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The originating question of this paper was whether rent- 
seeking arguments are compatible with the wealth-maximizing 
efficiency criterion. I have suggested that, because wealth 
maximization requires that we treat all voluntary transactions 
as welfare-improving, and because rent seeking involves 
voluntary transactions, it is inconsistent t o  categorize rent- 
seeking behavior as socially wasteful. This is contrary to what 
many antitrust economists and lawyers attempt to do when 
they assert that the total social cost of monopoly includes both 
an inefficient deadweight-loss component (which assumes a 
wealth-maximizing criterion of efficiency) and a rent-seeking 
social cost. What I have not argued is that rent-seeking 
arguments are either meaningless or lack intuitive 
attractiveness. In fact, the central insight of rent seeking-that 
certain activities are less socially desirable than others-may 
have some merit. Unfortunately, rent-seeking theorists have 
not offered a consistent criterion that can be used t o  
distinguish socially desirable activities from socially wasteful 
ones. As I point out above,65 our usual efficiency criterion 
rejects all such distinctions. Accordingly, a consistent theory of 
rent seeking would also have to provide a new efficiency 
analysis, not simply attempt to graft together two incompatible 
insights. 
65. See supra text accompanying note 44. 
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The following example from a popular economics 
textbooks6 is helpful in illustrating the meaning of the 
economic concepts of compensating and equivalent variation. 
As background, we suppose that a consumer has known 
preferences that satisfy the following conditions: completeness, 
reflexivity and transitivity. Given these properties, we can 
assign a real number to every possible consumption bundle, 
such that more preferred bundles get assigned larger numbers 
than the less preferred bundles. The resulting "utility" function 
will reproduce the order of the consumer's preferences. 
As a concrete example, we now suppose that the utility 
function has the form U(X1, X2) = XI% X2% , where Xi is the 
output of each of the two goods. If m is the consumer's income, 
and Pi is the price of each good, the demand functions in this 
example are: X1 = m/(2P1), X2 = mI(2P2). Assume that in the 
pre-monopoly state the consumer faces prices (1, 1) and has 
income 100. In this state, X1 = X2 = 50, and the consumer's 
total utility is U = 50%50%. 
Now we assume that the establishment of a monopoly in 
the production of good 1 causes the price of good 1 to increase 
to 2. With the initial income of m = 100, we would have X1 
drop to 25 while X2 remained a t  50, causing total utility to 
drop to U = 25%50%. The compensating variation is the 
amount of income increase that would be needed to provide the 
same utility a t  the new prices that one had prior to the price 
change. This needed income, called m,, can be derived from 
Equation 1 below: 
Equation 1 
From Equation 1 it follows that m, must be roughly $141, and 
the compensating variation is $141 - $100 = $41. Therefore, the 
consumer needs $41 of additional income to offset the price 
change. 
The equivalent variation is the amount of income that 
would have to be taken away from the consumer a t  the original 
66. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 
252 (2d ed. 1990). 
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prices to reduce the utility to the same amount as would the 
price changes. This also can be thought of as the maximum 
amount the consumer would be willing to bribe the monopolists 
not to establish the monopoly. This income amount, me, must 
satisfy Equation 2: 
Equation 2 
From Equation 2 it follows that me must roughly equal $70, 
and the equivalent variation is therefore $100 - $70 = $30. 
The consumers' surplus for this example will be between 
$30 and $41.~~ 
67. See supra text accompanying note 42; VARIAN, supra note 66, at 252. 
